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CHAPTER 9 
Labor and Employment Law 
ALAN J. McDONALD* 
§ 9.1. Introduction. Numerous judicial and legislative developments in 
Massachusetts labor and employment law occurred during 1985. Al-
though no single case decided in 1985 .can fairly be described as having 
landmark significance, in their totality the cases helped to further define 
labor and management rights in the areas of (1) public sector grievance 
arbitration under chapter 150E; (2) grievance arbitration under Massa-
chusetts Bay Transportation Authority labor contracts pursuant to chap-
ter 161A, section 19; (3) the duty to bargain in the public sector under 
chapter 150E as it relates to the unilateral change doctrine; (4) the stat-
utory rights of dismissed teachers; and (5) legal recourse for individual 
employees outside the sphere of collective bargaining. In addition, chap-
ter 150E was twice amended. The following sections report and analyze 
each of these developments. 
§ 9.2. The Enforcement of Public Sector Arbitration Awards Under 
Chapter lSOE. The Survey year was a frustrating one in large respects 
for public sector unions and the public sector arbitration process. In 1985 
the Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals Court each decided two 
cases involving the enforcement of public sector arbitration awards. In 
all four cases a public sector union had prevailed both before an arbitrator 
in grievances filed under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement 
negotiated pursuant to chapter 150E, and in subsequent petitions for 
enforcement in the superior court pursuant to chapter 150C, section 10. 
In all cases the Supreme Judicial Court and/or the Appeals Court reversed 
the superior court, and vacated the awards in whole or in substantial 
part. 
In the first of the two cases before the Supreme Judicial Court, School 
Committee of Boston v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 1 (BTU II) the 
Boston Teachers' Union had successfully arbitrated a claim for damages 
on behalf of laid-off teachers under a job security clause contained in its 
multi-year collective bargaining agreement with the Boston School Com-
* ALAN J. MCDONALD is a partner with the law firm of McDonald, Noonan & Kaplan. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of James Lamond, an associate in the 
firm, in preparing this chapter. 
§ 9.2. 1 395 Mass. 232, 479 N.E.2d 645 (1985) [hereinafter BTU II). 
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mittee. That same clause had been the subject of a 1982 decision by the 
Court2 (BTU I) in which the Court had held the job security clause 
unenforceable for any period exceeding one fiscal year,3 on grounds that 
decisions about the abolition of teaching positions because of declining 
pupil enrollment were entrusted by law to the exclusive managerial pre-
rogative of a school committee.4 Thus stymied in its efforts to obtain 
specific performance of the school committee's promise to maintain 
teaching positions at a certain level, the union returned to the arbitration 
arena to redress the contract violation in money damages. The arbitrator 
agreed with the union that the school committee had breached the job 
security clause, and awarded damages to each teacher for salary lost as 
a result of the layoffs. The superior court confirmed the damage award, 
and the Supreme Judicial Court granted the school committee's petition 
for direct appellate review. 
On review, the BTU argued that the holding in BTU I limited an 
arbitrator's right to award specific performance of a multi-year job se-
curity clause, but did not preclude an award of damages for breach of 
contract.5 In support of its argument, the BTU relied upon two earlier 
opinions of the Court in which arbitral awards for damages were enforced 
notwithstanding that other portions of those same awards, which had 
ordered specific performance of the underlying clauses, were vacated. 
Specifically, BTU cited School Committee of Braintree v. RaymontJ6 in 
which the Court vacated that portion of an arbitrator's award which 
directed the employer to reinstate a teacher to an abolished music director 
position, on the grounds that the employer's decision to abolish such 
position was, by state law, an exclusive managerial prerogative, and as 
such could not be delegated to an arbitrator. 7 Simultaneously, however, 
the Braintree Court enforced the arbitrator's award of damages for com-
pensation lost by the music director, noting that the damage award was 
"separable from [the arbitrator's] unauthorized determination that the 
employee should be reinstated. "8 Similarly, in School Committee of Lynn-
2 Boston Teachers Union v. School Committee of Boston, 386 Mass. 197, 434 N.E.2d 
1258 (1982) [hereinafter BTU I]. 
3 It is important to note, nonetheless, that the Court has explicitly recognized the en-
forceability in the public sector of multi-year collective bargaining agreements containing 
provisions for salary increases in fiscal years subsequent to the fiscal year in which such 
agreements are negotiated. See BTU I, 386 Mass. at 209 & n.17, 434 N.E.2d at 1265-66 & 
n.17. 
4 See G.L. c. 71, §§ 37, 42. 
5 BTU II, 395 Mass. at 235, 479 N.E.2d at 647. 
6 369 Mass. 686, 343 N.E.2d 145 (1976). 
7 /d. at 690, 343 N.E.2d at 148. 
8 /d. at 691, 343 N.E.2d at 149. 
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field v. Trachtman,9 the Court vacated an arbitrator's order for reinstate-
ment of a teaching position, but simultaneously enforced the arbitrator's 
order for payment of damages to a teacher who had been displaced with 
the elimination of the position. The Trachtman Court resolved the tension 
between its facially competing conclusions on the grounds that for pur-
poses of the nondelegability doctrine the question of damages is separable 
from the issue of specific performance. 
In reversing the decision of the superior court, and concluding that the 
arbitrator's award of damages should be vacated, the BTU II Court 
implicitly acknowledged the continuing vitality of the principle of separ-
ability established in Braintree and Trachtman, but refused to apply that 
principle to the facts at hand. 10 Noting that there was no evidence before 
the Court that there were "uncommitted, appropriate funds available to 
the school committee" 11 to pay the damages awarded, the Court qualified 
the principle of separability by holding that "an arbitrator acts in excess 
of his authority if damages are awarded for the breach of a provision in 
a collective bargaining agreement when, at the time of the breach, no 
funds had been appropriated to implement that provision. "12 
In the second case reviewed by the Court, School Committee of Hol-
brook v. Holbrook Education Association, 13 an arbitrator had found that 
the employer had breached the recall provision of its collective bargaining 
agreement with the teachers' union, and had ordered the employer to 
recall a laid-off physical education teacher to a vacancy in a school 
adjustment counselor position, with damages for lost compensation. The 
teacher in question had been certified by the State Board of Education 
as a guidance counselor, but had never been certified for, nor worked in, 
the vacant position. 14 In overturning the employer's decision to recall 
another laid-off teacher with less seniority than the grievant to fill the 
vacancy, the arbitrator found that the employer had historically recalled 
teachers within their order of seniority to fill positions for which they 
held state certification. Because none of the applicants for the vacancy 
held adjustment counsellor certifications, the arbitrator awarded the po-
sition to the grievant on the basis of seniority within a related certifica-
tion.15 
9 384 Mass. 813, 429 N.E.2d 703 (1981). 
10 BTU II, 395 Mass. at 235, 479 N.E.2d at 647. Specifically, the Court stated that "[t]he 
principle set forth in those two cases, that an award of damages 'is separable' from an 
arbitrator's mistaken conclusion that a particular decision by a school committee is arbitr-
able, is wholly inapplicable here." !d. 
11 !d. at 235, 479 N.E.2d at 647. 
" !d. at 236, 479 N .E.2d at 648. 
13 395 Mass. 651,481 N.E.2d 484 (1985). 
14 /d. at 652, 481 N.E.2d at 485-86. 
"!d. at 653, 481 N .E.2d at 486. 
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Noting that its role in reviewing an arbitrator's award was narrowly 
confined to "determining whether the arbitrator's award 'improperly in-
trudes into an area reserved for the judgment of the school committee 
regarding educational policy, "'16 the Court, nonetheless, concluded that 
it was "well settled" that appointment determinations were within the 
exclusive prerogative of school management, and thus beyond the au-
thority of an arbitrator to overturn. 17 Although acknowledging, at least 
implicitly, that the recall of a laid-off teacher differed by degree from the 
appointment of a new teacher, the Court, citing decisions by the Appeals 
Court in School Committee of Peabody v. International Union of Elec-
trical, Radio, and Machine Workers, AFL-C/0, Local294, 18 and School 
Committee of New Bedford v. New Bedford Teachers Association, 19 
nonetheless found the recall of a teacher to a position in which she had 
never served, and for which she was not technically authorized under 
the state's teacher certification schema, sufficiently analogous to an initial 
appointment decision so as to fall within the exclusive prerogative of 
management and outside the authority of an arbitrator. 20 Accordingly, 
the Court vacated the arbitrator's reinstatement order. On the strength 
of its separability doctrine, however, the Court upheld the arbitrator's 
award of damages for one year as a remedy for the employer's breach 
of the recall agreement. Describing the arbitrator's conclusion that the 
recall provision had been breached as a final determination not subject 
to judicial review,21 the Court, in reliance upon its decision in Tracht-
man,22 enforced the damage award. 
The BTU II and Holbrook decisions are important for two reasons. 
First, although affirming its long held view that an arbitrator's decision 
on the merits of a grievance is non-reviewable as long as the arbitrator 
acts within the scope of his authority, the Court also reemphasized its 
more recently adopted view that an arbitrator exceeds his authority when 
16 /d. at 654, 481 N.E.2d at 487 (quoting School Committee of Boston v. Boston Teachers 
Union, Local 66, 378 Mass. 65, 389 N.E.2d 970 (1979)). In that case, the Court held that 
an arbitrator did not enter forbidden ground when he enforced an employer's contractual 
promise to consult with the teachers' union before changing the nature of certain elementary 
school exams. It follows that merely because an issue subject to arbitration involves 
educational policies it is not automatically rendered nonarbitrable. Rather, a further analysis 
is required to determine whether arbitration of the issue presented compels unwarranted 
interference with powers statutorily reserved to a school committee. 
17 School Comm. of Holbrook, 395 Mass. at 655, 481 N.E.2d at 487. 
18 19 Mass. App. Ct. 449, 475 N.E.2d 410 (1985). 
19 9 Mass. App. Ct. 793, 405 N.E.2d 162 (1980). 
20 395 Mass. at 656, 481 N.E.2d at 488. 
"/d. at 657, 481 N.E.2d at 488 (citing School Comm. of Danvers v. Timan, 372 Mass. 
106, 115, 360 N.E.2d 877, 882 (1977)). 
22 Trachtman, 384 Mass. at 813, 429 N .E.2d at 704. See supra note 9 and accompanying 
text. 
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he intrudes into an area of decision making delegated by law to a public 
school committee. In furtherance of the latter notion, the Court approved 
the application of the nondelegability doctrine to decisions involving the 
lay-off of teachers because of declining enrollments and to the recall of 
teachers into positions they had never before held and for which they 
were never certified. In short, the Court's two decisions in these respects 
were predictable based upon prior case law, and represented but a quan-
titative expansion of the nondelegability doctrine. 
Second, although not revolutionary in their conclusion that an arbitra-
tor's award for damages may be enforceable where there is no showing 
that uncommitted, appropriated funds do not exist to pay the damages, 
even though the contract clause under which the breach occurred is not 
specifically enforceable, the two cases do appear to resolve a nagging 
inconsistency in one aspect of the Court's earlier nondelegability deci-
sions. Specifically, prior to BTU II and School Committee of Holbrook, 
it was unclear whether a public sector contract clause, which impermis-
sibly intruded into an area of decision making reserved exclusively to a 
public employer, was arbitrable for any purpose. This uncertainty 
stemmed from a 1978 decision, Berkshire Hills Regional School District 
Committee v. Berkshire Hills Educational Association,23 in which, at 
palpable odds with the separability doctrine enunciated in its earlier 
School Committee of Braintree case and its later Trachtman case, the 
Court held that a grievance subject to a school committee's non-delegable 
power could not be submitted to arbitration. 
In Berkshire Hills the school committee and teacher's union were party 
to a collective bargaining agreement which required that the committee 
give preference to applicants "already in the employ of the District" 
when filling the position of school principal. 24 When the committee re-
fused to observe that provision, an overlooked internal applicant grieved 
and the matter was eventually referred to arbitration by the union. In 
upholding a stay of arbitration granted by the superior court and affirmed 
by the Appeals Court,25 the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the 
contract clause at issue was not a proper subject for arbitration. More-
over, the Court expressly disagreed with the union's argument, advanced 
in reliance upon Braintree, that the stay should have been denied because 
even if the grievant's appointment was beyond the authority of the ar-
bitrator, it was not certain that an alternative award would have intruded 
into the school committee's exclusive domain. 26 Observing that "the very 
23 375 Mass. 522, 377 N.E.2d 940 (1978). 
24 Berkshire Hills, 375 Mass. at 523, 377 N.E.2d at 941. 
25 Berkshire Hills Regional School District Committee v. Gray, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 686, 
369 N.E.2d 73 (1977). 
26 Berkshire Hills, 375 Mass. at 528, 377 N.E.2d at 944. 
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subject of the proposed arbitration- [the grievant's] entitlement to the 
vacant principal's position - is a matter which, because of the school 
committee's exclusive and non-delegable power, cannot be submitted to 
the ultimate decision of an arbitrator, "27 the Court concluded that "an 
agreement to arbitrate a dispute which lawfully cannot be the subject of 
arbitration [such as the present one] was equivalent to the absence of a 
controversy covered by the provision for arbitration. "28 
Because the Court's holding in Berkshire Hills was so firmly and com-
prehensively stated, it was at best unclear whether the separability doc-
trine first announced in Braintree had survived. Since the grievant in 
Berkshire Hills arguably would have been entitled to at least a year's 
damages for lost compensation under the separability doctrine, the 
Court's foreclosure of arbitration altogether, coupled with its express 
rejection of the union's alternative award argument, left doubts about 
the vitality of that doctrine. When the Court decided Trachtman in 1981, 
without a single reference to Berkshire Hills, it was clear that the separ-
ability doctrine had indeed survived Berkshire Hills, and that Berkshire 
Hills was not to be read as broadly as its sweeping language might have 
suggested. 
The question lingered, however, as to whether the Court, for purposes 
of the separability doctrine, was implicitly drawing a line between con-
tract clauses which provided relief for incumbent teachers whose posi-
tions were cut in whole or in part, as in Braintree and Trachtman, and 
clauses which interfered with the appointment to educational positions 
never before held by the rejected applicant, such as in Berkshire Hills. 
School Committee of Holbrook suggests that the Court never intended 
such line drawing and that Berkshire Hills was simply a benign judicial 
twitch not to be accorded precedential deference. Because Holbrook 
involved the recall of a teacher to a position never held, which the Court 
characterized as "most analogous to an appointment decision,"29 it seems 
to follow, contrary to Berkshire Hills, that available relief, at least in the 
form of limited damages, would render arbitrable those contract clauses 
which may not be performed specifically through arbitration, even where 
the poWer implicated by the clause in question is the core power to 
appoint. 
In summary, the two cases decided by the Supreme Judicial Court in 
1985 have remained faithful to the Court's prior decisions in which the 
nondelegability doctrine has been invoked to render nonarbitral claims 
for specific performance of contract clauses which intrude impermissibly 
27 /d. at 529, 377 N.E.2d at 944. 
28 /d. at 530, 377 N .E.2d at 945 (quoting Berkshire Hills Regional School Dist. Comm. 
v. Gray, 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 690, 369 N.E.2d at 739). 
29 School Comm. of Holbrook, 395 Mass. at 656, 481 N .E.2d at 488. 
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into the powers of a school committee, and extended that doctrine to 
situations where a school committee has acted to reduce the size of its 
teaching force in light of declining enrollments and to appoint teachers. 
At the same time, however, the Court has clarified earlier doubts about 
the overall arbitrability of such clauses by upholding the right of unions 
to seek relief in arbitration for breach thereof as long as the relief awarded 
falls short of compelling their specific enforcement. 
School Committee of Peabody v. International Union of Electrical, 
Radio, and Machine Workers, AFL-C/0, Local294,30 an Appeals Court 
case pre-dating both BTU II and School Committee of Holbrook, also 
involved the vacation of an arbitrator's award on nondelegability 
grounds. Specifically, the arbitrator had ruled that two teachers were 
improperly denied appointment to positions as assistant principals under 
the terms of a contractual reduction-in-force agreement between the 
teachers' union and the school committee. That agreement purported to 
give such teachers an advantage over other applicants for the positions 
in question on the basis of seniority. In deciding for the union, the 
arbitrator ordered the school committee to appoint the teachers to the 
positions, and to pay them damages for compensation lost during the 
prior school year. 
Correctly anticipating the Supreme Judicial Court's subsequent deci-
sion in School Committee of Holbrook, the Appeals Court ruled that the 
appointment of an incumbent teacher, who is subject to a reduction-in-
force, to a position never before held by him or her, impermissibly 
intruded into the realm of decision-making reserved exclusively to the 
school committee by chapter 71. 31 The court incorrectly anticipated the 
Holbrook decision, however, on the question of damages. Thus, the court 
in School Committee of Peabody also vacated the arbitrator's award of 
damages for one year to the grievants, expressly relying upon the ration-
ale of Berkshire Hills as grounds for refusing to apply the separability 
doctrine.J2 Accordingly, that portion of the court's decision in Peabody 
holding that a contractual reduction-in-force clause contravened the non-
delegability doctrine, at least to the extent that it purported to compel 
appointment of teachers to positions for which they had never before 
been deemed qualified by the school committee, survives as good law. 
That portion of the decision holding that damages may not be recovered 
for breach of the clause does not appear to have survived in light of the 
Supreme Judicial Court's reinforcement in School Committee of Hol-
brook of the separability doctrine in teacher appointment cases. 
30 19 Mass. App. Ct. 449, 475 N .E.2d 410 (1985). 
31 /d. at 453-54, 475 N.E.2d at 413. 
32 /d. at 455, 475 N.E.2d at 414. 
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The Appeals Court decision in City of Somerville v. Somerville Munic-
ipal Employees Association33 explored a means other than the nondeleg-
ability doctrine by which a contract can offend the pre-existing statutory 
schema and require vacation of an arbitrator's award for breach of such 
clause. The nondelegability doctrine has been invoked to invalidate con-
tract clauses which are found impermissibly intrusive of a public em-
ployer's general grant of statutory authority to manage certain of its 
public responsibilities. 34 A second area of concern, however, involves 
the question of direct conflict between contractual language and detailed 
provisions of a pre-existing statute which is not listed in chapter 150E, 
section 7(d) as subordinate to a collective bargaining agreement,35 and 
represents a specific grant of authority to manage a particular aspect of 
public responsibility. 
City of Somerville involved a commonplace provision in a collective 
bargaining agreement covering various city employees including, inter 
alia, clerical workers, who worked in higher job classifications on a 
temporary basis. That provision, known in the labor vernacular as an 
"out of grade pay" clause, required the City to pay the salary rate of a 
higher classification to any lower-classified employee who had temporar-
ily worked in the higher classification for at least three days. 36 Typically, 
the provision was triggered when an incumbent in a higher classification 
went on vacation, sick leave, or another short-term leave. The City 
benefitted from the arrangement by obviating tedious and time consuming 
paperwork that would have been required at civil service for securing a 
temporary appointment in the absence of the out of grade pay clause, 
and by insuring the continuity of its operations through employment of 
a seasoned hand during the absence of the incumbent. The employee 
working out of grade obviously benefitted from the increased salary rate, 
payable after three days in the position. 
Although the City and the Somerville Municipal Employees Associa-
tion had lived in substantial harmony under the out of grade clause for a 
number of years, a problem developed over application of the clause in 
the City's assessing department. Specifically, upon the retirement of an 
executive secretary in that department, the chairman of the board of 
33 20 Mass. App. Ct. 594, 481 N.E.2d 1176,/urther appellate review denied, 396 Mass. 
1102, 484 N.E.2d 103 (1985). 
34 To date, the nondelegability cases have been confined primarily to the area of public 
education. It is unclear to what extent the doctrine will be applied, if at all, to other public 
functions. 
35 G.L. c. 150E, § 7(d) lists various pre-existing statutes, and provides that as to each 
statute listed any conflicts with a collective bargaining agreement are to be resolved in 
favor of such agreement. 
36 City of Somerville, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 595, 481 N.E.2d at 1179. 
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assessors authorized a lower-classified employee, a head clerk, to assume 
the duties of the vacant executive secretary position on an acting basis, 
and also authorized a yet lower classified employee, a principal clerk, to 
assume the duties of the head clerk on an acting basisY The mayor, 
however, who was the appointing authority under civil service law,38 
would not approve out of grade pay for either of the two lower classified 
employees. The mayor defended his refusal on grounds that he was 
reviewing whether there was a continuing need for the executive secre-
tary position, and until that review was completed, did not want employ-
ees assigned out of grade work. 39 
The chairman of the board of assessors persisted in the assignment of 
out of grade duties notwithstanding the mayor's refusal to authorize extra 
pay. The employees continued to perform the out of grade work, and the 
mayor continued to deny out of grade pay. Accordingly, the Association 
filed a grievance over the nonpayment, and the matter was processed to 
arbitration. 40 After hearing and argument, the arbitrator found that under 
the contractual out of grade pay clause, the City owed compensation for 
the out of grade work performed by both lower-classified employees. He 
ordered payment thereof retroactively as well as prospectively until such 
time as the chairman of the board discontinued the extra duties.41 The 
City moved to vacate in the superior court, and when the superior court 
enforced the award, the City filed an appeal with the Appeals Court. 
After reviewing the various means by which employees may be lawfully 
appointed to serve in positions covered by civil service law,42 the Appeals 
Court concluded that the out of grade system in the parties' contract, at 
least as applied in the case before it, was not one of those means. As the 
mayor was the appointing authority under civil service law, the court 
reasoned that only he could fill the higher classified position, permanently 
or temporarily.43 The court rejected the Association's argument that no 
"appointment" was ever made to the two lower-classified employees who, 
in the Association's view, had remained in their normal positions and 
merely had been assigned temporarily additional duties of the higher 
classifications. The court concluded that the out of grade clause, as 
interpreted by the arbitrator, transferred the authority to appoint from 
37 Id. at 595-96, 481 N.E.2d at 1179. 
38 See G.L. c. 31, § I et seq. 
39 Under the controlling Somerville ordinances, the mayor had control of the assessor's 
budget, but could not remove, and thus could not control, either the Chairman or other 
members of the board of assessors as they were elected officials. See Somerville City 
Charter, §§ 20-21. 
"'City of Somerville, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 597,481 N.E.2d at 1179. 
41 Id. at 597, 481 N.E.2d at 1179-80. 
42 Id. at 598, 481 N.E.2d at 1180. 
43 Id. at 600, 481 N.E.2d at 1182. 
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the mayor to the chairman of the board of assessors, and in so doing 
created an irreconcilable conflict between the collective bargaining agree-
ment and civil service law. 44 Because civil service law is not specifically 
listed in section 7(d) of chapter 150E, that law prevails in the case of 
such conflict, warranting, in the court's view, a reversal of the superior 
court. 
Read broadly, the City of Somerville case could be interpreted to 
invalidate the out of grade clause contained in the City of Somerville's 
collective bargaining agreement with the Association, as well as to in-
validate similar out of grade clauses in myriad other collective bargaining 
agreements throughout the state. Certainly, the court's zealous concern 
about the integrity of the civil service process, and its uncomplimentary 
references to the concept of out of grade work45 might lead one to believe 
that the decision should be so construed. 
A narrower reading of the court's holding is available, however, and 
would seem to be the most sensible way to read the decision. Under the 
narrower reading, the decision can be limited to the peculiar facts of the 
case. Thus, an unusual confluence of state and local law led to a situation 
where (1) the appointing authority had no ability to control the actions 
of an independently elected department head; (2) a collective bargaining 
agreement negotiated by the appointing authority on behalf of the City 
required the City to pay for out of grade work authorized by the depart-
ment head; and (3) the assignment to work on an out of grade basis was 
, not limited to a short period of time. Under these circumstances appar-
ently, the City of Somerville holding would preclude enforcement of a 
higher pay requirement in the underlying contract clause. Where, how-
ever, the appointing authority has control over the assignment of out of 
grade work, and such work is assigned only for a limited time period, it 
is possible that a City of Somerville-like out of grade pay clause would 
be enforceable. Moreover, even where the assignment of an employee to 
out of grade work by an appointing authority extended beyond a limited 
time period, a contract clause unquestionably would be enforceable for 
higher pay provided the appointing authority took certain procedural 
steps required under civil service law to make a provisional, temporary, 
or emergency appointment of the employee doing the out of grade work. 46 
Finally, to the extent that the Appeals Court decision vacated the 
arbitrator's award on damages, it also appears to be inconsistent with 
44 /d. at 602-03,481 N.E.2d at 1183. 
45 /d. 
46 The Appeals Court acknowledged that an acute need for a prompt appointment to fill 
a vacancy could be satisfied by such types of appointment. /d. at 603 n.l4, 481 N.E.2d at 
1183 n.14. There appears to be no bar to the enforcement of higher pay for individuals so 
appointed pursuant to a contractual out of grade pay clause. 
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School Committee of HolbrookY An application of the separability doc-
trine to City of Somerville would have permitted the City to have paid 
the grievants for out of grade work performed by them through the 1984 
fiscal year. That result would not have had the effect of compelling an 
appointment contrary to civil service law,48 but would have provided 
limited relief to the grievants whose only fault was that they followed 
their immediate superior's instructions. As the question of damages was 
not raised in the request for further review filed by the association, the 
Supreme Judicial Court's denial of such request may not be read as an 
acceptance of the Appeals Court's conclusion on the issue of damages.49 
A third decision by the Appeals Court in 1985, City of Worcester v. 
Borghesi,50 also involved an arbitrator's award, which, in turn, directly 
implicated specific provisions of a pre-existing state statute. Unlike the 
civil service law at issue in City of Somerville, however, the statute at 
issue in City of Worcester, chapter 41, section 111F, is listed in section 
7(d) of chapter 150E. Accordingly, the collective bargaining agreement 
was not subject to attack on grounds of conflict with state law. 
In City of Worcester, a police officer was injured in the line of duty, 
and was granted leave with full pay pursuant to chapter 41, section 111F. 51 
A disagreement subsequently ensued between the officer and a physician 
designated by the City, pursuant to that chapter, over the officer's fitness 
to return to work. When the City, in reliance on the physician's opinion, 
removed him from leave status and ordered him back to work, the officer 
filed a grievance under a provision of his collective bargaining agreement 
which apparently52 incorporated chapter 41, section 111F by reference. 
An arbitrator determined that the officer was still incapacitated when 
recalled to duty, and ordered the City to compensate the officer for lost 
wages from the date of the improper recall to November 24, 1981, the 
date on which the officer was suspended and rendered ineligible for leave 
status for reasons unrelated to the arbitration matter. The City appealed 
the grant of compensation, arguing, inter alia, that the arbitrator ex-
ceeded his authority because under chapter 41, section 111 F, the desig-
47 See supra note 10. 
48 See School Committee of Holbrook, 395 Mass. at 657, 481 N.E.2d at 488. 
49 In its application for further appellate review, the Association made a tactical decision, 
which in retrospect seems stubborn and narrow minded, to eschew a request for limited 
damages in order to confront head on the Appeals Courts' failure to harmonize the out of 
grade clause and Civil Service Law. The tactician in the case is also the author of this 
article. 
50 19 Mass. App. Ct. 661, 477 N.E.2d 155 (1985). 
51 ld. at 661, 477 N.E.2d at 156. 
52 The actual contract clause at issue was not specifically identified or quoted in the 
Appeals Court opinion. 
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nated physician, and not the arbitrator, was entrusted with determining 
incapacity. 53 
The court noted that although the City's argument was couched in 
terms of excessive authority, it was essentially an attack on the arbitra-
tor's conclusions of fact and law. Reasserting its long held belief that 
such attacks were outside the scope of the court's review, the court 
concluded that the award was valid and enforceable. 54 The court's narrow 
focus in City of Worcester contrasts vividly with cases such as City of 
Peabody and City of Somerville and is explained by the fact that the 
latter two cases involved statutes not listed in chapter 150E, section 7(d). 
§ 9.3. The Enforcement of Public Sector Grievance Arbitration Awards 
Involving the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). Col-
lective bargaining by employees of the MBTA is regulated by chapter 
161A, section 19 et seq., 1 rather than by chapter 150E. In particular, 
chapter 161A, section 19 authorizes collective bargaining over various 
employment issues between the MBTA and certain of its employees, and 
expressly permits the MBTA to include in such agreements a grievance 
and arbitration procedure culminating in final and binding arbitration. 
During the Survey year, the Appeals Court in MBTA v. Loca/589, Amal-
gamated Transit Union,Z explored the enforceability of grievance arbi-
tration awards issued pursuant to chapter 161A, section 19. 
The grievant in the case was hired by the MBTA into a bargaining unit 
position in 1970. Three years later he was promoted to a management 
position outside of the bargaining unit, and remained there until that 
position was eliminated in March of 1981. He then sought to exercise so-
called "dropback" rights to return to the bargaining unit. 3 Although his 
union voted to allow the dropback, the MBTA refused his request to do 
so on the basis of inherent management rights. The union filed a grievance 
on the grievant's behalf under the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment which had terminated on December 31, 1980, but which had con-
tained a rollover provision continuing its terms "from year to year there-
after unless changed by the parties."4 Following a full hearing, the 
arbitrator, rejecting various employer defenses, ruled that the grievant 
53 City of Worcester, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 664,477 N.E.2d at 157. 
54 Id. at 665, 477 N.E .. 2d at 157-58. 
§ 9.3. 1 G.L. c. 161A, § 19 as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 581, § 8, provides for 
collective bargaining over wages, hours and certain other subjects, prohibits collective 
bargaining over certain enumerated "matters of inherent management right," and provides 
for final and binding arbitration of contractual disputes between the parties. 
2 20 Mass. App. Ct. 418, 480 N.E.2d 1044, further appellate review denied, 396 Mass. 
1002, 484 N.E.2d 102 (1985). 
3 ld. at 419 n.l, 480 N.E.2d at 1046 n.l. 
• ld. at 420, 480 N.E.2d at 1046. 
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was entitled to dropback pursuant to a past practice which was expressly 
grounded in a contractual past practice clause. The MBTA was ordered 
to reinstate the grievant to his former bargaining unit position with full 
back pay and benefits.5 
A superior court judge subsequently vacated the award on the grounds 
that it conflicted with the MBTA's management rights under chapter 
161A, section 19. The union appealed to the Appeals Court, raising 
several issues and offering the Appeals Court an opportunity to clarify 
several areas of the law regarding the enforceability of grievance arbitra-
tion awards under chapter 161A, section 19. 
First, the union argued that the MBTA's petition to vacate was un-
timely pursuant to the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act, chapter 
251, sections 12 and 13, and that the superior court erred by concluding 
otherwise. On this point, however, the Appeals Court determined that 
chapter 251 applied only to commercial arbitration, and did not encom-
pass actions to enforce collective bargaining agreements. 6 Alternatively, 
the union argued that the MBTA's petition to vacate was barred by the 
thirty-day limitations period contained in chapter 150C, section 11(b). 
Rejecting MBTA's contention that chapter 150C did not apply to it as it 
was a political subdivision of the Commonwealth, the court held that the 
reference to "employers" in chapter 150C, section F was to be read 
expansively, and, absent express exclusionary language in either chapter 
161A, section 19 or chapter 150C, could not be deemed to exclude the 
MBTA.8 
Notwithstanding that the time limits in chapter 150, section ll(b) were 
held applicable, the court declined to find that the MBTA's petition to 
vacate was untimely. As the applicability of chapter 150C had not been 
argued in the superior court, the Appeals Court viewed that issue inap-
propriate for consideration on appeal. More importantly, the court con-
cluded that the issue of timeliness under chapter 150C was analogous to 
s ld. 
6 Id. at 422, 480 N.E.2d at 1047. 
7 G.L. c. 105C, § 1 states: 
I d. 
A written agreement or a provision in a written agreement between a labor organi-
zation or organizations, ... and an employer or employers to submit to arbitration 
any existing controversy or any controversy thereafter arising between parties to 
the agreement, including but not restricted to any controversy dealing with rates of 
pay, wages, hours or other terms and conditions of employment of any employee or 
employees, shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, except as otherwise provided 
by law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
8 MBTA v. Local 589, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 422, 480 N.E.2d at 1047-48. The court was 
also careful to distinguish grievance arbitration from interest arbitration, the latter of which 
is subject to G.L. c. 161A, §§ 19(c)-19(g). 
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a statute of limitations defense, and, as such, had to be proven by the 
party raising it. 9 Because the union had raised timeliness as a defense in 
its answer, but had offered no proof as to when the underlying arbitrator's 
award had been received by the MBTA for purposes of triggering the 
limitations period, the timeliness defense failed. 10 
On the merits, the Appeals Court addressed three additional issues. 
Initially, the MBTA argued that the union was without standing to arbi-
trate the grievant's dropback rights since the grievant was out of the 
bargaining union in an executive position at the time the alleged grievance 
arose. The court disagreed with that argument, holding that the applica~ 
bility of the dropback right for a former bargaining unit member on leave 
to take a managerial position was strictly a matter of contract interpre-
tation, which was to be left to the arbitrator. 11 Next, the MBTA contended 
that the contractual obligation to arbitrate had not survived the expiration 
of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Quoting from an earlier 
decision by the Supreme Judicial Court, in Boston Lodge 264, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Machinists v. MBTA, 12 for the proposition that the 
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement did not necessarily mean 
that the obligation to arbitrate grievances arising under that agreement 
expired, the Appeals Court also rejected this contention. 13 Further, as 
the collective bargaining agreement at issue contained a rollover provi-
sion, extending the pre-existing terms until a change therein had been 
negotiated, the Appeals Court had little difficulty in finding the matter, 
which arose only three months into the rollover period, arbitrable. 14 
Finally, the MBTA argued that chapter 581, section 8 of the Acts of 
1980, the management rights amendment to chapter 161A, section 19, 
prohibited collective bargaining over appointments to employment posi-
tions and, thus, prohibited it from complying with the arbitrator's 
award. 15 The court also rejected this contention, reasoning that the man-
agement rights amendment, by its own terms, did not apply to grievance 
arbitration arising under collective bargaining agreements which had been 
negotiated prior to the enactment of such amendment. Accordingly, the 
9 /d. at 425, 480 N.E.2d at 1049. 
10 /d. at 425 & n.8, 480 N.E.2d at 1049 & n.8. 
11 /d. at 426, 480 N.E.2d at 1049. 
12 389 Mass. 819, 821, 452 N.E.2d 1155, 1156 (1983). The Court held that where an 
agreement includes obligations extending beyond its term, and where the promise to arbi-
trate grievances arising thereunder is broadly expressed, the duty to arbitrate will survive 
the agreement's expiration. 
13 MBTA v. Local 589, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 426-27, 480 N.E.2d at 1049-50. 
14Jd. 
15 /d. at 427, 480 N.E.2d at 1050. 
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court reversed the judgment of the superior court and ordered entry of 
a new judgment enforcing the arbitration award. 16 
The primary importance of the foregoing case is the application of 
chapter 150C to MBTA collective bargaining agreements and the exten-
sive body of law, largely sympathetic to the arbitration process, that has 
developed thereunder. Secondarily, the case serves as a clear warning to 
a party raising timeliness defenses under chapter 150C that explicit proof 
as to the date the arbitration award at issue was received by the party 
seeking its vacation is required as a condition to dismissal on timeliness 
grounds. 
§ 9.4. The Duty to Bargain Under G.L. c. l50E and the Unilateral 
Change Doctrine. During the Survey year, three cases were reported, 
outside of the arbitration context, involving the duty to bargain under 
chapter 150E. Each involved actions by public employers which were 
opposed by unions on unilateral change theories. 1 That is to say, in each 
instance the union argued that a unilateral change in a mandatory subject 
of bargaining was unlawfully implemented by the employer. 
The first case, Newton Branch of the Massachusetts Police Association 
v. City of Newton, 2 tempted the Supreme Judicial Court with the intrigu-
ing question whether an employer's right under chapter 150E to imple-
ment its last offer following good faith collective bargaining to impasse,3 
included the right, upon impasse, to unilaterally change a term of em-
ployment, which is both a mandatory subject of bargaining under chapter 
150E, section 6, and subject to regulation by a pre-existing statute listed 
in chapter 150E, section 7(d), so that the term of employment, as 
changed, was inconsistent with the pre-existing statute.4 Stated differ-
ently, the issue is whether a public employer has a right to implement a 
proposed change in a condition of employment, which is inconsistent 
with such statutory requirement, after bargaining to impasse, even though 
chapter 150E provides that an agreement reached through collective 
bargaining will supercede any inconsistent requirement of all statutes 
listed in chapter 150E, section 7(d). 
The statute in question, chapter 41, section 111 F provides leave with 
pay for police officers incapacitated by an injury, sustained in the line of 
16 /d. at 427-28, 480 N.E.2d at 1050. 
§ 9.4. 1 See School Committee of Newton v. Labor Relations Commission, 388 Mass. 
557, 447 N.E.2d 1201 (1983), for a detailed review of the unilateral change doctrine. 
2 396 Mass. 186, 484 N.E.2d 1326 (1985). 
3 See Massachusetts Organization of State Engineers and Scientists v. Labor Relations, 
389 Mass. 920,927,452 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (1983) [hereinafter MOSES]. 
4 City of Newton, 396 Mass. at 190-91, 484 N.E.2d at 1329. 
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duty, for the period of such incapacity.5 The union, in negotiations for a 
successor to a contract expiring on June 30, 1982, sought to change a 
pre-existing contract clause which had incorporated the protections of 
chapter 41, section 111F, by permitting a third physician to resolve 
conflicts between an officer's physician and a physician designated by 
the City under section 111F over an officer's physical status.6 The City 
eventually counterproposed by accepting the union's third physician pro-
posal, but, in addition, insisted upon a limited duty clause which would 
require an officer to forfeit leave status if found by the third physician to 
be capable of performing limited police duties on either full or part-time 
duty basis. 7 After impasse was reached, the City implemented its offer. 
The union filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief in superior 
court, arguing that the City's unilaterally-imposed policy was inconsistent 
with section 111F, and was therefore unlawful. 
Unfortunately for those interested in the answer to the unilateral 
change question, the Court eschewed the flirtation posed by the union's 
appeal by finding that the change implemented by the City of Newton 
was consistent with chapter 41, section 111F. Specifically, the Court held 
that chapter 41, section 111 F did not prohibit the involuntary return to 
work of a police officer who was partially incapacitated, yet fully able to 
perform an assignment within the scope of the officer's job description.8 
Since no conflict with chapter 41, section 111F resulted, there was no 
need for the Court to determine what the legal effect would be of a 
unilateral change in a term of employment which, as changed, conflicted 
with a section 7(d) statute.9 
Interestingly, although the Court expressly declined to answer the 
unilateral change question, it did uphold that portion of the City's uni-
lateral change which (1) provided for referral of disagreements (between 
an officer's physician and a physician designated by the City) over an 
officer's physical status to a third physician for resolution and (2) per-
mitted the officer to remain on leave during the interim. 10 Both the referral 
to a physician beyond the designated physician, and the continuation of 
paid leave following a determination by the designated physician that the 
officer was no longer incapacitated are facially inconsistent with section 
111F. Although the union itself had proposed the same conditions, no 
agreement on them was ever reduced to a collective bargaining agreement 
5 G.L. c. 41, § II IF. 
6 City of Newton, 396 Mass. at 188, 484 N.E.2d at 1327. 
7 Id. at 188, 484 N.E.2d at 1327-28. 
8 Id. at 192, 484 N.E.2d at 1330. 
9 Id. at 191, 484 N.E.2d at 1329. 
10 Id. at 192-93, 484 N.E.2d at 1330. 
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for purposes of chapter 150C, section 7(d), since other portions of the 
City's proposal on the subject remained unacceptable to the union. 
In City of Newton, the Court seems to have authorized a municipal 
employer to deviate from the requirements of a section 7(d) statute. The 
Court stated, however, that the third physician provision was a greater 
benefit than officers enjoyed under section lllF, and that since the City 
did not eliminate any rights guaranteed by section lllF, its deviation 
from that section was permissible. 11 Although not expressly stated, the 
Court may also have upheld the City's change in leave policy because to 
the extent that change was inconsistent with section lllF, it was consis-
tent with the union's stated position at the bargaining table. Whether the 
City's deviation from section lllF resulted in greater benefits, it was, 
nevertheless, a deviation not reduced to a written collective bargaining 
agreement. For what it is worth, the Court's rationale on this point seems 
inconsistent with the plain terms of chapter 150E, section 7(d). All the 
more inconsistent, at least in the view of this author, would be a decision 
by the Court in a later case which purported to authorize a public em-
ployer to unilaterally change a term of employment following impasse in 
a manner inconsistent with both section 7(d) and the stated position of a 
union. 
A subsequent case involving the rights of an employer to unilaterally 
change a condition of employment was substantially more mundane. In 
Town of Lee v. Labor Relations Commissions, 12 the public employer 
refused to permit a police officer, whose position was within a lawfully 
designated collective bargaining unit, to move his residence from Lee, 
Massachusetts to a neighboring town. More pointedly, in reliance upon 
a residency by-law promulgated by the Town in 1954,13 the employer 
advised the officer that if he moved he would be fired. 
The union contended that the threat to terminate the officer represented 
a new or changed policy on the part of the Town over a mandatory 
subject of bargaining, and demanded negotiations. When the Town re-
fused to bargain over its residency requirements, the union filed a charge 
of prohibited practice with the Labor Relations Commission. After hear-
ing, the Commission sustained the charge, and the town appealed to the 
Appeals Court. 14 
II Id. 
12 21 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 485 N.E.2d 971 (1985). 
13 The by-law stated in relevant part: "A citizen of the town qualified under the General 
Laws applicable to Police Departments in towns under civil service shall be eligible for 
membership in the Police Department." 21 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 167, 485 N.E.2d 971, 972. 
14 G.L. c. l50E, § ll, states in pertinent part: "Any party aggrieved by a final order of 
the commission may institute proceedings for judicial review in the Appeals Court within 
thirty days after receipt of said order." 
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In agreement with the Commission's long-stated position, the Appeals 
Court first concluded that a residency requirement as a condition of 
continued employment, as compared with a condition of hire, is a term 
or condition of employment within the meaning of chapter 150E, section 
6, and is, therefore, a mandatory subject for bargaining.'5 Moreover, in 
accordance with the supremacy afforded a collective bargaining agree-
ment over conflicting town by-laws by chapter 150E, section 7(d), the 
court determined "as a matter of logic" that if a collective bargaining 
agreement was silent on a particular section 6 subject, a public employer 
must bargain about any new or changed policy or requirement with 
respect thereto, notwithstanding the language of any town by-law. 16 The 
court concluded its inquiry by reviewing the Commission's factual finding 
that the town's position reflected a change and/or new policy, under the 
substantial evidence rule. After doing so, the court held that the Com-
mission finding was justified. 17 
In summary, Town of Lee reflects an affirmation of the Commission's 
view that residency requirements as conditions of continued employment 
are subject to the mandatory bargaining obligation under chapter 150E, 
section 6. Thus, a public employer wishing to impose a residency re-
quirement must first offer a union representing its employees an oppor-
tunity to bargain over such a requirement, and if the union so wishes, 
must bargain to agreement or impasse prior to implementation thereof. 
The final unilateral change case decided during the Survey year in-
volved a prohibited practice charge before the Labor Relations Commis-
sion alleging that a school committee had unlawfully required a doctor's 
certificate from absent teachers who had been suspected of participating 
in a "sick out." In School Committee of Leominster v. Labor Relations 
Commission, 18 negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement 
had reached impasse. During the negotiations period the old agreement 
continued in effect beyond its expiration date pursuant to a carry-over 
clause. The school committee, having heard that the teachers were plan-
ning a sick-out for two days, wrote the teachers union advising, inter 
alia, that it would require a physician's statement from any teacher absent 
from school during the sick-out period, and would not pay sick leave 
compensation unless such statements were provided. 19 Arguably, this 
approach was inconsistent with a provision ofthe parties' contract, which 
15 Lee, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 167 & n.3, 485 N.E.2d at 972 & n.3. 
16 /d. 
17 /d. 
18 21 Mass. App. Ct. 245, 486 N.E.2d 756 (1985), further appellate review denied, 396 
Mass. 1107 (1986). 
19 /d. at 246, 486 N.E.2d at 757. 
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permitted the school committee to require a doctor's certificate after five 
(5) days of absence. 2o 
Subsequently, an unusually large number of teachers called in sick on 
one of two consecutive days as rumor had predicted. The school com-
mittee filed a strike investigation petition with the Labor Relations Com-
mission under chapter 150E, section 9A(b),21 and simultaneously notified 
the absent teachers that a medical certificate would be required as a 
condition to sick pay for the days each teacher had missed. The Com-
mission declined to rule that the absences constituted an unlawful strike 
by the union, but found preliminarily that "a number of individuals may 
have" induced or encouraged a strike. 22 No further relief was sought at 
the Commission by the committee, and no further proceedings were held 
on the strike petition. 
The teachers' union promptly filed a prohibited practice charge alleging 
that the medical certification requirement was an unlawful unilateral 
change in violation of the school committee's duty to bargain in good 
faith pursuant to chapter 150E, section 10(a)(5).23 After a full review, the 
Commission concluded that notwithstanding the existence of a unilateral 
change, the committee's requirement of medical certification was war-
ranted in view of the strong statutory policy against public employee 
strikes under chapter 150E, section 9A(a). 24 
After a convoluted tour of the judicial system, detailed in the court's 
opinion,25 the case finally reached the Appeals Court. Rejecting the 
union's argument that the Commission should not have excused the 
committee's unilateral change without having first explicitly found that a 
strike had occurred, the court vigorously upheld the Commission's con-
clusion that the committee's reaction to a suspected strike was 
"reasonable"26 in light of the public policy considerations involved. 
Although School Committee of Leominster does not give a public 
employer carte blanche to ignore the Commission's unilateral change 
20 /d. at 248, 486 N.E.2d at 758. 
21 G.L. c. 150E, § 9A(b) provides in pertinent part: 
!d. 
[W]henever a strike occurs or is about to occur, the employer shall petition the 
commission to make an investigation. If after investigation, the commission deter-
mines that any provision of paragraph (a) of this section has been or is about to be 
violated, it shall immediately set requirements that must be complied with, including 
but not limited to, instituting appropriate proceedings in the superior court ... for 
enforcement of such requirements. 
22 School Committee of Leominster, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 247, 486 N.E.2d at 757. 
23 Id. at 248, 486 N.E.2d at 758. 
24 /d. at 249 n.8, 486 N .E.2d at 759 n.8. 
25 !d. at 250, 486 N.E.2d at 759. 
26 /d. at 251, 486 N.E.2d at 759. 
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doctrine during an apparent public employee strike, the case stands firmly 
for the proposition that a public employer may take reasonable steps to 
investigate the circumstances of an apparent strike and to withhold com-
pensation from apparent strikers, even though one or more of such steps 
would not be condoned under chapter 150E, section 10(a)(5) absent a 
strike setting. 
§ 9.5. The Teacher Dismissal Cases. During the Survey year, in Solomon 
v. School Committee of Boston, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court examined 
the impact of a maternity leave taken by a provisional teacher on her 
eligibility for tenure under chapter 71, section 41.2 The maternity leave 
issue arose in the context of a de novo hearing before the superior court, 
pursuant to chapter 71, section 42A, over Solomon's dismissal by the 
school committee. In that hearing, as a threshold matter, the school 
committee contended that an earlier maternity leave taken by Solomon 
under chapter 140, section 105D,3 constituted a significant disruption of 
her service during a year needed by her to acquire tenure, and thereby 
disqualified her from tenure under chapter 71, section 41.4 The superior 
court agreed with the school committee and dismissed the complaint. 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted a petition for direct appellate review. 
On appeal, the school committee first argued that chapter 149, section 
105D, which requires completion of an initial probationary period for 
teachers as a condition precedent to the receipt of maternity leave,5 did 
not apply to non-tenured teachers since they were probationary employ-
ees within the meaning of that law. The Court rejected that argument, 
interpreting the language in section 105D, requiring completion of an 
initial probationary period to mean the first several months of employ-
ment not to exceed six months,6 rather than the entire period of their 
§ 9.5. 1 395 Mass. 12, 478 N.E.2d 137 (1985). 
2 G.L. c. 71, § 41, known as the teacher tenure law, provides for tenured status upon 
appointment to a fourth consecutive year of employment as a teacher. 
3 G.L. c. 140, § 105D, provides that a female employee who has completed her proba-
tionary period, and is then absent for no longer than eight weeks for the purpose of giving 
birth, shall be entitled to her same or similar job upon timely notice and return to work. 
However, the statute also prohibits the inclusion of maternity leave in the computation of 
any benefits, rights and advantages not provided all employees while on leaves of absence. 
4 Solomon, 395 Mass. at 13-14, 478 N.E.2d at 139. 
5 See G.L. c. 149, § 105D. 
6 Solomon, 395 Mass. at 15, 478 N.E.2d at 139. The Court relied upon regulations 
promulgated by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination pursuant to G.L. 
c. 151B, §§ 3(5), 3(6), and 3(11)(A) as controlling the length of the probationary period 
required for maternity leave under § 105D. The Court concluded that the relatively short 
probationary period promulgated by the MCAD was within that agency's regulatory power, 
and was more consistent with the purposes underlying§ 105D than was the three year pre-
tenure period established under G.L. c. 71, § 41. Id. at 16, 478 N.E.2d at 139. 
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employment before obtaining tenure. For teachers, such as Solomon, in 
a school system without a set probationary period, the Court relied upon 
section 105D to define the initial probationary period as the first three 
months of employment, and thus found that Solomon had been eligible 
for leave under that section. 
The Court then turned to the more troublesome argument of the school 
committee. Relying upon the statutory exclusion in section 105D, of time 
spent on maternity leave in the computation of an employee's benefits, 
rights and advantages, the school committee argued that time on leave 
which could not be counted for various employment rights, including 
tenure, necessarily interrupted the consecutive nature of prior service 
toward tenure, and required recommencement of such service in order 
to achieve tenure. 7 
In resolving the apparent conflict between the exclusionary language 
in section 105D and the constitutionally protected choice of a female 
teacher to have a child, 8 the Court construed the legislative intent un-
derlying section 105D to permit a teacher on maternity leave to retain 
her pre-leave years of service for purposes of determining her eligibility 
for tenure, but to preclude use of time spent on such maternity leave in 
computing length of service for tenure purposes. Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that Solomon's leave did not interrupt her continuity of service 
towards tenure, and remanded the case to the superior court for a de 
novo hearing on the dismissaP The Court expressly declined to answer 
the further question whether a teacher who has taken a maternity leave 
must serve an entire additional school year to compensate for the partial 
school year lost to maternity leave. 10 
The Solomon case is important in two respects. Certainly the increased 
job protection afforded female teachers seeking to advance their careers 
without forfeiting their right to bear children is a valuable gain. Equally 
important, however, is the Court's endorsement of the need to harmonize 
more recently enacted employment-related statutes with the pre-existing 
statutory scheme which has granted comprehensive power to municipal 
managers, in order to achieve the legislative intent behind the more recent 
legislation. 11 
The second teacher dismissal case decided by the Supreme Judicial 
7 /d. at 17-18, 478 N.E.2d at 140. 
8 /d. at 18, 478 N.E.2d at 140 (citing Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632, 639-40 (1974)). 
9 Solomon, 395 Mass. at 18-19, 478 N.E.2d at 140-41. 
10 /d. at 19, 478 N.E.2d at 141. 
11 /d. at 18, 478 N.E.2d at 140 (citing, inter alia, Dedham v. Labor Relations Commission, 
365 Mass. 392, 402, 312 N.E.2d 548, 556 (1974)). 
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Court, Martin v. School Committee of Natick, 12 and an Appeals Court 
decision, Breslin v. School Committee of Quincy, 13 reviewed the statu-
tory, constitutional, and contractual rights of teachers and principals to 
a hearing prior to dismissal or demotion. Both cases reaffirmed earlier 
holdings 14 by the Court that teachers have no rights to a predispositional 
hearing where the decision to demote or dismiss has been made in good 
faith on the basis of policy decisions related to a decline in the number 
of students, or to budgetary considerations. Thus, in Breslin, the Appeals 
Court had little difficulty in concluding that former administrators in the 
Quincy school system were not entitled under statute or constitution to 
demotion hearings when their positions were abolished during a bona 
fide district reorganization. As the Appeals Court noted, "[o]nce it is 
established that the abolition of the ... positions was rooted in policy 
and that there were reasons related to educational objectives in opting 
for an open selection process for the new jobs (i.e., the jobs created by 
the reorganization), the case for the plaintiffs collapses. 15 
While standing for the same proposition, the Supreme Judicial Court's 
decision in Martin deserves more attention for two reasons. First, Martin 
highlights a plaintiff's heavy burden of proof when seeking a predismissal 
hearing on statutory or constitutional grounds in the face of declining 
enrollment or budgetary claims. Martin, a teacher dismissed during a 
reduction in force due to declining enrollments, argued that his dismissal 
was not motivated by a declining enrollment, but rather, was based on 
allegations offered of poor performance. In support of this contention, 
Martin produced evidence that at the time he was dismissed purportedly 
due to declining enrollments, he was already awaiting a dismissal hearing 
before the school committee based upon performance related allegations 
by the superintendent. 16 Martin argued that the sudden substitution of 
the dismissal on declining enrollment grounds was a ruse designed to 
deprive him of his right to a disciplinary dismissal hearing. 17 
Characterizing Martin's argument as having "intuitive appeal,"18 the 
Court, nevertheless, affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the action. 
In essence, the Court reasoned that the coincidence of the dismissal due 
to declining enrollments with the scheduling of the disciplinary dismissal 
12 395 Mass. 461, 480 N.E.2d 625 (1985). 
13 20 Mass. App. Ct. 74, 478 N.E.2d 149, further appellate review denied, 395 Mass. 
1102, 481 N.E.2d 197 (1985). 
14 See Boston Teachers Union, Local66 v. School Committee of Boston, 386 Mass. 197, 
434 N.E.2d 1258 (1982); Milne v. School Committee of Manchester, 381 Mass. 581, 410 
N.E.2d 1216 (1980). 
15 Breslin, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 76, 478 N.E.2d at 153. 
16 Martin, 395 Mass. at 466-67, 480 N.E.2d at 628. 
17 /d. 
18 /d. at 461, 480 N.E.2d at 628. 
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hearing was insufficient, without more, to compel a conclusion that the 
former was a sham designed to avoid the latter. 19 The Court concluded 
that "as long as there is an actual need for a RIF, the School Committee 
is free to dismiss teachers without complying with the notice and hearing 
requirements of G.L. c. 71, § 42."20 Because there was evidence that 
enrollments were declining, and that fewer teachers were needed, the 
Court permitted Martin's dismissal without a hearing. 
Second, Martin, reveals an expansion in the scope of judicial inquiry 
beyond the traditional statutory criteria in a section 43A case. There is 
nothing new about permitting a teacher in a statutory action under chapter· 
71, section 43A to contest a disciplinary dismissal.21 The judicial inquiry 
in such cases, however, historically has been limited to those factors 
specifically identified in chapter 71, section 41 and has not extended to 
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 22 This historical approach 
by the Court is entirely consistent with well established law in the private 
sector. Although there is neither any federal statute providing judicial 
review to dismissed private sector employees which parallels the protec-
tions of chapter 71, section 43A, nor an election of remedies statute 
which parallels chapter 105E, section 8, which expressly permits a 
teacher to elect either arbitration or a statutory action to contest dis-
missal, the federal courts have from time to time been asked to review 
the propriety of an employee dismissal in consideration of certain con-
tractual protections claimed by the employee in his/her collective bar-
gaining agreement. Because of the national policy favoring resolution of 
private sector labor disputes through voluntary arbitration,23 the United 
States Supreme Court has refused to allow federal or state courts to 
consider a dismissed private sector employee's claims arising out of a 
collective bargaining agreement, and has limited such employee's re-
course to the arbitration process, except in the limited case where the 
employee first proves that his collective bargaining agent has breached 
its duty to represent the employee fairly in the grievance/arbitration 
procedure. 24 Quite simply stated, absent a breach of a union's duty of 
fair representation, federal law precludes judicial consideration of a dis-
19 /d. at 467 n.9, 480 N.E.2d at 628 n.9. 
20 /d. at 467, 480 N.E.2d at 628 (emphasis supplied). 
21 See G.L. c. 71, § 43A. 
22 Specifically, G.L. c. 71, § 42 requires in part that no tenured teacher may be discharged 
"[e]xcept for inefficiency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teacher ... , insubordination 
or other good cause . . . . " 
23 See the so-called "Steelworkers Trilogy": United Steelworkers of America v. American 
Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and 
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise 
Wheel and Car Corp., 362 U.S. 593 (1960). 
24 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1964). 
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missed employee's claims for relief which arise out of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. The Supreme Judicial Court has freely applied this 
law in private sector cases over which it has held concurrent jurisdic-
tion, 25 and has extended the law into the public sector, at least in the 
context of suits by an individual employee against the Massachusetts 
Bay Transportation Authority.26 
Notwithstanding the Court's historical approach in section 43A cases, 
the existence of a binding arbitration clause, and the absence of a claim 
that Martin's union breached its duty of fair representation, the plaintiff 
in Martin was allowed to argue that certain clauses of the collective 
bargaining agreement between his union and the school committee pre-
cluded his dismissal. Specifically, Martin argued that (1) procedures re-
quired by the agreement for a critical evaluation of his performance had 
not been followed; (2) a notice requirement of the agreement was not 
followed; (3) his seniority rights under the agreement were violated; and 
(4) an earlier evaluation was not reviewed from his personnel file in 
apparent breach of the agreement. 27 
Although the Court concluded that none of Martin's contractual claims 
were sufficiently compelling to have avoided entry of summary judgment 
against him, 28 the decision is remarkable in that the Court actively con-
sidered the contractual arguments. Because the Court's focus under sec-
tion 43A in non-disciplinary dismissal cases has been confined narrowly 
to determining whether the policy decision leading to a reduction in force 
has been made in good faith, and whereas the Court has been generous 
in reviewing explanations advanced by a school committee in support of 
such decisions,29 a former teacher's chances of overturning his/her dis-
missal have been slim. However, to the extent that the Court is willing 
to consider limitations which have been negotiated into a collective bar-
gaining agreement on a school committee's right to select a particular 
teacher for a non-disciplinary dismissal in a section 43A proceeding, the 
chances for successful challenge of such dismissal are greatly expanded. 
Thus, in Martin, for example, notwithstanding the proven need for a 
reduction in force, the Court appeared willing to consider the possibility 
of Martin's reinstatement, had Martin offered persuasive evidence that 
he was as qualified as less senior teachers who had been retained in the 
school committee's employ, pursuant to the terms of the applicable col-
lective bargaining agreement which afforded job security to equally qual-
25 See Balsavich v. Teamsters Local 170, 371 Mass. 283, 356 N.E.2d 1217 (1976). 
26 Norton v. MBTA, 369 Mass. I, 336 N.E.2d 854 (1975). 
27 Martin, 395 Mass. at 468, 480 N.E.2d at 629. 
28 /d. at 468-70, 480 N.E.2d at 629-30. 
29 See, e.g., Milne v. School Committee of Manchester, 381 Mass. 581,410 N.E.2d 1216 
(1980). 
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ified teachers on the basis of seniority.30 Although the Court rejected 
Martin's claims for lack of proof, the applicability, validity and strength 
of the underlying contract clauses appear to have passed judicial scrutiny, 
and to have thus expanded both the scope of judicial inquiry beyond the 
traditional statutory criteria, and the chances of success in court for a 
section 43A plaintiff. In light of Martin, organized groups of teachers 
and other employees should negotiate specific protection for individual 
teachers or groups of teachers in anticipation of layoffs due to declining 
enrollments or budgetary factors, and feel comfortable that such protec-
tions will be applied regardless of whether a teacher chooses arbitration 
or a section 43A complaint to challenge dismissal. 31 
The Court's willingness to consider contractual protections has great 
tactical significance for individual teachers. If a teacher elects arbitration 
under chapter 150E, section 8, for example, normally his/her union must 
also agree to have the case arbitrated before arbitration can occur. Sub-
sequent to Martin, however, if the union acting in complete good faith 
refuses to move the case to arbitration, the teacher may still have an 
opportunity to have his contractual rights reviewed and enforced under 
section 43A. Moreover, even if a union agrees to take a teacher's case 
to arbitration, it may still be to the teacher's advantage to elect a statutory 
rather than arbitral forum. Generally, if a union takes a case to arbitration, 
the teacher must accept the union's attorney as his attorney in the case. 
Furthermore, the union's view of the case may not always be entirely 
consistent with the teacher's, and the union may be unwilling to make 
certain arguments, harmful to its institutional interests, that would be 
helpful to the teacher's case. In these circumstances the teacher is cer-
tainly better off electing a section 43A suit, as he can choose his own 
attorney and make his own arguments regardless of his union's point of 
viewY In conclusion, Martin, an ostensibly innocuous case in which a 
30 Martin, 395 Mass. at 470, 480 N.E.2d at 630. 
31 It is likely that a review of the collective bargaining agreement, absent a claim that the 
plaintiff was unfairly represented by his union, was undertaken because of the election of 
remedies provision in G.L. c. 150E, § 8. That analysis, which is not relevant in the private 
sector, would also suggest that other public sector plaintiffs, who do not have a similar 
election option, will not be able to avoid their collective bargaining agreement arbitration 
obligation absent a breach of the duty of fair representation. 
32 Martin also has important implications as to when a teacher's election of remedy must 
be made. Although G.L. c. 150E, § 8 expressly states that where "arbitration is elected by 
the employees as the method of grievance resolution, (it shall) be the exclusive procedure 
for resolving any such grievance involving suspension, dismissal, removal or termination 
... "(emphasis supplied), the Court refused to consider one of Martin's contractual claims 
on grounds that Martin had earlier grieved such claim, but could not proceed to arbitration 
because of his union's refusal to do so. It is unclear whether the Court concluded that 
Martin had not "elected" his statutory remedy, because he had apparently been forced into 
it for lack of options, or because he had "elected" to pursue his contractual grievance 
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displaced teacher once again failed to regain employment, and in which 
traditional notions of deference were again expressed with respect to a 
school committee's right to reduce its teaching staff, actually has great 
significance to individual teachers, teacher unions and school committees 
alike. 
In the final decision involving a teacher dismissal, Martell v. Teachers 
Retirement Board,33 the Appeals Court reaffirmed the principle that a 
public employee could have his legal right to retirement benefits under 
chapter 32 determined in a court action for declaratory relief, 34 rather 
than through an action before the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board 
(CRAB). This decision is in accord with the court's earlier decision in 
the case of Brown v. Taunton. 35 Noting that there were no disputed facts 
requiring resolution by CRAB, the court concluded that the issues of law 
could be resolved as easily by a court as by CRAB.36 Because such an 
employee must know in advance what his/her resources will be, the court 
viewed an action for declaratory relief as an ideal forum for promptly 
determining the employee's legal claimY 
§ 9.6. Individual Employee Actions Outside the Sphere of Collective 
Bargaining. In Massachusetts, as in various other jurisdictions across the 
country, individual employees have sought legal recourse in ever increas-
ing numbers outside the sphere of collective bargaining against their 
employers for dismissals or other adverse action which those employees 
have viewed as unfair. Although such employees have made some inroads 
into the once impenetrable employment-at-will doctrine, 1 two suits de-
cided by the Appeals Court during the Survey year failed to advance 
those inroads. In Azzi v. Western Electric Co., 2 the plaintiff Azzi had 
procedure before filing suit under§ 43A. In either event, the Court's conclusion is suspect. 
If the Court's conclusion regarding election was based upon the former analysis, it reflects 
an unnaturally rigid view and can be fairly characterized as unfortunate judicial hairsplitting. 
If based on the latter analysis, the Court's conclusion is plainly inconsistent with clear 
statutory language which binds a teacher to his/her forum at the time arbitration is selected 
rather than when a grievance is filed. Perhaps later cases will either clarify or revise the 
Court's approach on this point. 
33 20 Mass. App. Ct. 188, 479 N.E.2d 191 (1985). 
34 See G.L. c. 231A, § I. 
35 16 Mass. App. Ct. 614, 454 N.E.2d 488 (1983). 
36 Martell, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 190, 479 N.E.2d at 192. 
37 /d. 
§ 9.6. 'See, e.g., Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 
(1981); Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); McKinney 
v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980). Traditionally, an employment 
contract which is "at will" may be terminated by either side without reason. See Fenton 
v. Federal St. Bldg. Trust, 310 Mass. 609, 612, 39 N.E.2d 414, 415 (1942). 
2 19 Mass. App. Ct. 406, 474 N.E.2d 1166 (1985). 
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been employed by the defendant as a machine operator, and was, as 
such, covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the defen-
dant and Local 1365 of the Communications Workers of America. That 
agreement contained a grievance and arbitration procedure for resolution 
of disputes over the dismissal of employees in the bargaining unit. Azzi 
was terminated by the defendant when, following a satisfactory physical 
examination conducted by an employer physician, he failed to return to 
work from a disability leave which he had been on since suffering a work 
related injury months earlier. 3 Without contesting the dismissal through 
the grievance and arbitration procedure, Azzi sued Western Electric in 
superior court, claiming that the dismissal violated the collective bar-
gaining agreement and independently constituted a breach of the common 
law doctrine of good faith and fair dealing articulated by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. 4 The superior 
court dismissed the action upon the defendent's motion for summary 
judgment and Azzi appealed. 
Applying established law, the Appeals Court summarily affirmed the 
superior court's dismissal of the plaintiff's argument grounded in the 
collective bargaining agreement. 5 Noting that Azzi had neither exhausted 
his rights under the applicable grievance/arbitration procedure nor 
charged that his collective bargaining agent had represented him unfairly 
in the grievance process, the court ruled that he had not fulfilled the 
conditions precedent to qualify for judicial relief. 6 This analysis is entirely 
consistent with the relevant federal and state precedent. 
With respect to the common law claim, however, the court was without 
explicit guidance from Massachusetts' case law. Azzi argued that the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing applied by the Supreme Judicial 
Court in the at-will employment situation presented in Fortune, should 
also be available to an employee who is employed under the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement which creates substantive rights to job 
security, and contains a grievance procedure for enforcing those rights. 
Rejecting this argument, the court observed that the ability of Azzi to 
have secured relief through the grievance procedure distinguished this 
case from Fortune, and compelled dismissal. Any other result, noted the 
court, would subvert the orderly process for dispute resolution estab-
lished by Western Electric and the union. 7 In this regard, the court's 
opinion is sound. Not only did Azzi have an available remedy under the 
collective bargaining agreement, but that remedy potentially was far more 
3 /d. at 408, 474 N .E.2d at 1168. 
4 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). 
'See supra § 4.5 notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
6 Azzi, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 408-09, 474 N.E.2d 1168-69. 
7 /d. at 410, 474 N .E.2d at 1169. 
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expansive than the circumscribed Fortune holding would have provided.8 
Accordingly, the prejudice to a plaintiff in Azzi's situation arising from 
a refusal to apply the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is slight. In 
addition, the discharge of employees for performance-related reasons, 
even if unfair, does not provoke or deserve the same level of indignation 
by our society as does a discharge for discrimination based upon invidious 
motives such as race, sex or similar classifications,9 and therefore would 
not appear to warrant the dual access to a contractual grievance/arbitra-
tion procedure and the court system accorded to discrimination-based 
claims. 10 
In the second case filed by an individual employee seeking to overturn 
an allegedly wrongful discharge outside of the collective bargaining pro-
cess, Rafferty v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 11 the plaintiff, em-
ployed provisionally pursuant to chapter 31, section 41 by the Massa-
chusetts Department of Public Welfare as assistant director of field 
operations for the department's child support enforcement unit, had been 
spoken to on several occasions by his immediate supervisor about the 
quality of his work. 12 In light of the supervisor's continuing dissatisfaction 
with his work, the plaintiff subsequently was transferred to another job 
assignment. Following a further employment-related problem between 
the plaintiff and his supervisor, the plaintiff was asked to resign. Although 
he initially agreed "to leave quietly" if allowed to stay on for an additional 
three weeks, the plaintiff later refused to resign, and was terminated. 13 
Without requesting a hearing under chapter 31, section 41, 14 the plain-
tiff filed suit in superior court alleging that his dismissal deprived him of 
property without due process of law in violation of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, 
constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress, and was a 
breach of contract. 15 After a jury-waived trial, the superior court entered 
judgment for the plaintiff on all but the emotional distress count. The 
superior court found that the plaintiff had substantive rights to the pro-
tection of an employer-personnel policy dealing with progressive disci-
8 In Fortune, the plaintiff's only recovery was monetary. He was not awarded reinstate-
ment, nor does the case holding suggest that reinstatement is a remedy available in a good 
faith and fair dealing case. 
9 See G.L. c. 151B, § 4. 
10 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
11 20 Mass. App. Ct. 718, 482 N.E.2d 841 (1985),further appellate review denied. 
12 /d. at 719-20, 482 N.E.2d at 843. 
13 /d. at 720-21, 482 N .E.2d at 843. 
14 G.L. c. 31, § 41 provides discharged provisional employees with an opportunity for an 
informal hearing before the appointing authority, and makes the decision of the appointing 
authority on the merits of the discharge final and binding. See Rafferty, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 723 n.8, 482 N.E.2d at 845 n.8. 
15 Rafferty, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 721, 482 N.E.2d at 843. 
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pline, and that under such policy he had a constitutionally protected 
property interest in continued employment; that the plaintiff had not been 
required to exhaust his chapter 31, section 41 administrative remedy; and 
that his discharge breached the terms of the aforesaid personnel policies, 
apparently on the basis of an implied contract theory. 16 
The Appeals Court reversed the judgment on all counts. Ruling that 
the personnel policy upon which the superior court had grounded the 
plaintiff's constitutional claim to continued employment was applicable 
only to tenured employees, the court found further that there was no 
state or federal statutory requirement that precluded the removal of a 
provisional employee without just cause. 17 Moreover, the court declared 
that under Massachusetts law, a provisional employee must exhaust the 
administrative remedy provided by chapter 31, section 41 before pursuing 
other contract claims, if any, over which the superior court had jurisdic-
tion.18 Since the plaintiff had not exhausted the administrative remedy, 
he had no basis to pursue a superior court action. Finally, the court, with 
minimal discussion, found no basis for the plaintiff's contract claim under 
an implied obligation of good faith or fair dealing. 19 
The court noted, but left unanswered, the question whether a non-
tenured employee, who has exhausted available administrative remedies 
under chapter 31, section 41, can sue in superior court under a contract 
or other claim based upon a personnel policy which purports to expand 
that employee's right beyond the protection of an appointing authority 
hearing under chapter 31, section 41. 20 Although it can be argued that 
the legislature did not intend that provisional employees have rights 
greater than the section 41 hearing, there is no express statement to that 
effect anywhere in chapter 31. In addition, to the extent that a public 
employer is willing to expand the right of non-tenured employees to job 
protection, perhaps in an effort to enhance its ability to recruit more 
qualified personnel, or perhaps merely to ensure fair treatment of its 
employees as a management philosophy, there seems to be little basis in 
logic to preclude it from doing so. Accordingly, until such time as the 
legislature expressly limits the ability of a public employer to supplement 
16 The Appeals Court opinion does not detail the legal theory relied upon by the trial 
judge on the contract counts. However, later in its opinion, the court suggests that the trial 
court may have relied on a good faith and fair dealing theory. See Rafferty, 20 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 725, 482 N.E.2d at 846. 
17 Rafferty, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 723, 482 N.E.2d at 845. 
18 Jd. at 723-24, 482 N.E.2d at 845. 
19 Id. at 725, 482 N.E.2d at 846. 
20 I d. In this regard, see Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 492 (N.D. Ga. 1985), 
where the court concluded that personnel policies promulgated by the City, including, inter 
alia, a rule that discipline could be imposed only for cause, created a protected property 
interest which could not be interfered with absent due process. 
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the protection offered by section 41, it would appear appropriate for the 
courts to permit employee lawsuits based upon expanded protections 
that may exist, upon exhaustion of the section 41 procedures. 
§ 9.7. The Statutory Amendments. Chapter 150E, the public employee 
collective bargaining law, was twice amended in 1985. The first amend-
ment, 1 which provided for the confidentiality of the work product of 
public sector mediators by prohibiting disclosure of such work product 
in non-criminal legal proceedings, extended the confidentiality privilege 
to private sector mediators, including those operating under chapter 150, 
section 10A.2 This enactment helps insure the actual and perceived neu-
trality of mediators, and thus invite open communication between me-
diators and the parties to labor dispute, a factor critical to the fair and 
prompt resolution of such disputes. Although the prohibition against 
disclosure by mediators may create problems of proof in subsequent 
arbitration or civil cases involving the intent of contract language nego-
tiated with the assistance of a mediator, the greater degree of openness 
afforded the bargaining process would seem to outweigh the proof prob-
lems created by the legislation. 
The second amendment granted interest arbitration rights to state and 
metropolitan district commission police officers as a means of resolving 
impasse in contract negotiations. This enactment is significant in light of 
the repeal of a parallel right to interest arbitration for municipal police 
officers and firefighters as result of the so-called Proposition 2-1/2 refer-
endum in November of 1980.3 
§ 9.7. 'Acts of 1985, ch. 357, § 2. 
2 /d. at § 1. G.L. c. 150, § lOA provides: 
Any person acting as a mediator in a labor dispute, including any person acting as 
such pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, who receives information as a 
mediator relating to the labor dispute shall not be required to reveal such information 
received by him in the course of mediation in any administrative, civil or arbitration 
proceeding. Nothing herein contained shall apply to any criminal proceedings. 
3 Acts of 1980, ch. 580, § 10. 
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